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ABSTRA
The economic costs of adverse health outcomes have typically been evaluated in a context
of risk neutrality, an approach thatignoresthe potential welfare importance of individuals' risk
preferences. This paper presents a framework that unifies the research in health capital and
earnings with that on risk preferences in the presence of stochastic outcomes. The model is
implemented to obtain estimates of the economic damages due both to general health problems
as well as to one specific health problem that is of considerable interest from society's
perspective: alcoholism. Our empirical findings, based on data from the Epidemiologic
Catchment Area survey, indicate that failure to recognize the possibility of risk averse preferences
leads to a potentially serious underestimation of the magnitudes of the "costs" of alcoholism and
poor health. In particular, it is shown that while alcoholism problems have negative impacts on
the conditional mean of income (consistent with most of the existing literature), they also have
positive impacts on the conditional variance of income. Our conclusions are to some degree
provisional because our estimates of conditional variances are necessarily biased to the extent that
unobserved heterogeneity is an important determinant of the moment structure of income in our
sample.
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Department of Economics Department of Epidemiology
Trinity College and Public Health
Hartford, Cl' 06106 Yale Medical School, Box 3333
and NBER New Haven, Cl' 06510
and NBERL Introduction
Thatpoor health is costly to society is a proposition few would debate. Apart from the very
real costs associated with pain and suffering themselves, poor health -whencharacterized as
a depressed stock of one kind of productive human capital —hasrepeatedly and in many
contexts been shown to result in reduced earnings and income, in disruptions to normal family
life, and in a variety of other undesirable social consequences)
Nonetheless, despite the rigorous theory and econometrics that have been devoted to
analyzing suéhrelationships,the economic damages attributed to adverse health outcomes have
typically been evaluated in contexts that do not account for cxante uncertaintysurrounding
valued outcomes, thereby ignoring the vast literatuke on the importance of risk preferences
towards stochastic outcomes.2 Thus, for instance, if a specific health problem is found to
reduce wages or earnings by $500 on average, then $500 is typically considered to be the per
capita "cost" -orat least the —manifestedin the labor market —attributableto the health
problem. Even if implemented in a reasonable manner, such strategies are inherently "a post
productivitybased"rather than "a antewelfare-basedapproaches for measuring "social costs";
in partiäilar, no allowance is made for risk aversion or the cxante stochasticnature of earnings.
This paper presents an framework that unifies to some degree the research in health capital
and earnings and in individual attitudes towards and decisionmaking in the presence of a ante
stochasticoutcomes.' The fundamental objective is to obtain a more comprehensive picture of
1. See, e.g., Bartel and taubman (1979, 1986) and Rice et al. (1990).
2. Some parallel issues arise in the analysis of uncertain medical expenditures, but for that issue
the importance of cxante riskaversion has long been recognized as the driving force underlying
the market for health insurance.
3.Agood analogy is the agricultural economics literature on estimation of the welfare costs of
output variations; see Antic (1988) for an overview of the key issues.
1the "cost? of general health problems as well as one specific health problem that is of
considerable interest from society's perspective: alcoholism.' A prevalent health problem,'
especially among males,' alcoholism has been estimated to result in sizeable costs to society.7
The basic idea underlying the analysis can be summarized as followâ. Suppose individuals
have indirect utilities, V(.;y), defined over some measure of income,Y, and that each
individual confronts aante a probabilitydisthbution of a postincomeoutcomes, (.Q;X)
whichis conditioned on a vector of the individual's characteristics,Q=(Z,e).Only some
elements ofi.e. Z, are observed by the econometician; etis"unobserved heterogeneity"
in the usual sense.
Conditional onincome is stochastic a antefromthe individual's perspective, as one
property of the conditional distribution t(Y1JQ4;X) is assumed to be var(YIQ)>0. In this
setting, an individual who, due to some policy change or otherexogenous shock, experiences
a shift inwill be confronted with a new a anteincomedistribution and will accordingly
experience an a antewelfarechange whose direction and magnitude depend both on properties
Ingenera1,evenifthesij
"mean-preserving," there will be welfare consequences so long as there are variance effectsand
4. See Cook (1990) and Mullahy (1993) forsurveys of the key issues, and NIAAA (1990) for
details. NIAAA's estimate of the "economic cog" of alcohol abuseand alcohol dependence is
$136.3 billion for 1990 (NL&AA (1990),p. 174).
5.SeeAmerican Psychiatric Association (1980, 1987) for themedicallpsychiairic perspective of alcoholism as a health disorder.
6. Over 10% of males aged 18 to 65are at any point in time estimated to manifest alcoholism
symptoms, and more than twice this number are estimated to have exhibitedsymptoms of
alcoholism at some point over the course of their lifetimes.Conversely, only about 3% of
females are estimated to suffer from alcoholismsymptoms.
7. See, for instance, Chapters II and VII of NL4AA(1990) and Rice et al. (1990).
2individuals are not risk neutral.
The paper has two main objectives. The first is to document empirically how theprobability
distribution of income outcomes —inparticular, its mean and variance —dependson observables
Z, especially those of interest from a policy perspective.' Our particular focus is on how
medically-defined alcoholism as well as general health status affect the moment structure of
incomes.It mightbenoted that this study was motivated initially by the concern that
econometric studies of how general health status and, in particular, alcoholism' affect labor
market performance may miss an important part of the evaluative picture to the extent that they
focus only on mean effects, as is typically the case in regression analysis of such phenomena.'°
This observation motivates our second objective, which is to consider in a mean-variance
utility framework how such information might be utilized to gain some understanding of the
welze implications associated 11th policies designed to change various elements of the
observablesZ. To the extent that moments of Yt of higher order than the mean depend on;,
then welfare computations based solely on how shifts in ;affectthe mean ofwill misstate
the ne welfare effects of the shift inif individuals are not risk neutral. The empirical
8. There are some commonalities of this paper with that of Low and Ormiston (1991), who
specify and estimate using MS data a stochastic specification akin to that described below.
Their framework did not account for the role of health problems as determinants of the moment
structure of income.
9. See Mullahy (1993) for a survey on the relationships between alcohol use and labor market
performance.
10. Much of the pertinent literature —economicsand otherwise -isconcerned with the 'cost?
of illness. By explicitly or implicitly invoking a 'wage equals value of marginal product'
assumption, many such studies conclude in essence that the point estimate of the health status
parameter in wage/earnings/income regressions is a measure of the productivity loss associated
with the health problem. However, the relationships between such productivity losses and
welfare in the way economists usually think of welfare are not obvious unless stringent
assumptions (e.g. risk-neutrality) on preferences are invoked.
3complication is that the economethcian,whose data permitconditioning onlyonbut not on
allelements ofwilltendto measure greater conditional variance fromthedata apost than
theindividual confrontsaante solong as therole ofinconditioning s(YtIz,et;x)is
nontriviaL"
Theplan is as follows. Section II presents an expected utility framework in which both first
and second moment welfare consequences of poor health can be assessed. Section III discusses
the econometric strategy and data. Section IV presents the estimation results. Section V
presents a setaf estimates of some of the costs of alcoholism and poor health that are manifested
in the labor market Section VI concludes.
U. Health and Welfare
As above, consider an individual whose preferences can be described by an indirect utility
function defined on income, V=V(Y;y), where Y >0 denotes income, VI> 0, andy is a vector
of parameters that characterize preferences. From an a ante perspective, an individual with
characteristics Q has a wise welfare determined by his or her expected utility (EU)
11. The unobserved heterogeneity S may, for example, have the character of an individual's
knowledge of the quality of his/her job attachment or match or the knowledge of certain
contractual or legal requirements that mitigate the uncertainty of labor market outcomes. With
a reference to Becker (1975), Eden and Pun (1981) state succinctly the empirical implications
of such unobserved heterogeneity in a context similar to that considered here:
The problem with using the large unexplained portion of the cross-sectional
dispersion of earnings to construct measures of the uncertainty in different
earnings profiles is that individuals possess information on their probable future
positions in the eaniings distribution, that we, in our role as researchers, do not
Thus Becker concludes his discussion of the variance in the returns to college
education with the question: How much of this large variation in the gain from
a college education can be anticipated due to known differences in ability,
environment, etc., and, therefore, shotald not be considered part of the a ante
risk?'
4EU(Q;y,X) a'"(O,o')V(Y;7)dt(YIQ;X),
where the parameters 'y describe preferences towards risk Theexplicit dependence of expected
utility on the parameters of the indirect utility function and the distribution function iswritten
to emphasize that expected utility depends on the parametric sflcture of bothpreferences and
the data generating process, as well as on any covariates that might conditionpreferences and
probability distributions.'2
To focus ideas, the miliar Grossman-Becker-MJncer13 humancapital framework provides
a convenient structure within which such dependencies might be analyzed.Dropping observation
subscripts, suppose y=In(Y) is determined as
y= fQ.4Z;a),o(Z;$), e,4. (1)
where tç)ando'(.)denote(in a sense to be made clearer below) conditional mean and variance
conditional functions, respectively, and where e represents thecomponent of log-income that is
aante stochasticto the individual, Zt(K,H,)Q summarizes all observable covariates, with K
a vector of human capital measures other than health (e.g. schooling, experience), Ha vector
12. We ignore here the interesting complication that arises when theutility function V(.) is itself
health-state-dependent (e.g. different t values depending on whether or not one is in thepoor
health state, or explicitly conditioning V(.) on Z), and instead allows Z to conditiononly the
distribution function. Ignoring state-dependence of this naturemay result in an underestimate
of the expected utility losses due to poor health, as the approachproposed here accounts only
for health-related income differentials, not for welfare losses due to"pam and suffering." For
interesting discussions of this and rlnsd issues, see Cook and Grabam (19Th, Smith and
Desvousges (1987), and Viscusi and Evans (1990).
13. Grossman (l972a, 1972b), Becker (1975), MIncer (1974).
Sof health status measures, and X a vector of other covariates that affect the distribution of y.
If larger values of H indicate better health, then much empirical research'4 suggests that
aE(YIQ)IOH>O,i.egood health is a productive component of human capital. Any reasonable
specification of preferences would have'3
Eu(J%,x,e;7,x)> Eu(H,x,e;7,x), (2)
i.e. eapected utility is greater, ceterif paribas, in the good ((3) health state than in the poor (P)
health state. Of course, even in the absence of risk and variance considerations, one would be
led to this conclusion simply as a consequence of the 3E(Y Q)/ØH >0 result. However, once
risk aversion and health-dependent conditional income variances are admitted, then as suggested
above the standard differences in mean income approach to assessing the costs associated with
adverse health outcomes is seen to provide only a partial picture of the welfare losses that attend
poor health.
Were it found empiricaily, for instance, that ÔE(yJOJIôH>0 and Ovar(yjOJ/8H<O, i.e.
good health increases conditional mean income and reduces income's conditional variance, then
in the presence of risk aversion there are two channels —amean effect and a variance effect —
throughwhich poor health diminishes welfare. In such circumstances, welfare analysis must
recognize that in addition to the lower mean incomes they would wish to avoid, risk-averse
individuals would also be willing a awe to incur positive risk premia to avoid adverse health
outcomes.
14. See, for instance, Bartel and Taubman (1979, 1986), Benham and Benham (1982) and Luft
(1975).
15. IC is henceforth absorbed as partofX
6The model (1)-fl) provides a convenient analytical framework for assessing the key policy
issue at hand, i.e. whether interventions designed to mitigate, forestall, or prevent adverse health
outcomes mayhavepayoffs in terms of increased expected utility that could well exceed simply
the health-related differences in mean incomes. To the extent that the differences between EU
in the good and poor health states can be described in terms of monetary equivalents (e.g.
compensating or equivalent variations), it is then possible to meaningfuliy identi' one
component of the true economic costs of poor health.
To this end, if7 (the preference parameters) and X (the probability distribution parameters)
are known or estimable, then measurement of such costs would be feasible. The empirical
analysis of such a structure would be relatively straightforwaid were it not for 0•whose
presence introduces a fundamental identification problem: the a ante(and,therefore,
welfare-relevant) variance confronted by the individual and the a postvariancethe
econometrician can measure will in general not be the same.
The empirical and evaluative implications of unobserved heterogeneity depend on precisely
howe enters the model. While several reasonable possibilities can be entertained,.the leading




where s(.)=v'o(.), and suppose that the unobservables (e,0)andcovariates satisfy the following
mean-, variance-, and covariance-independence conditions:"
16. See Manski (1988) for a discussion of the implications of these statistical restrictions.
7E(eZ) =E(IZ)covfr,eZ) =0,
=var(eZ)=var(e),and revar(OIZ) = var(6).
That is, the observable conditioning covariates Z are assumed to be exogenous in a particular
sense)7 It follows from (.)that
E(yJZ) =s(Z;a), (3a)
and, since var(yjZ)=E(y2Z)-E2(yz),
var(y I Z) = o'(Z;fl)r8 + t. (3b)
Notethat a(Z;$)r8 is the true a wilelog-incomevariance confronting the individual whereas
ci(Z;Thre+re is what the econometrician can measure a post.
The particular manner in which 6 enters the model in conjunction with the true functional
17. While the discussion of "overdispersion" is cast here in terms of unobserved heterogeneity,
there may be other reasons why the econometrician measures variance that is not relevant a
wisetothe individual dcc isionmakej. For example, if any element of Z is measured inaccurately
by the econometriciaji, then there is an extra source of 'error' and, therefore, error variance,
the econometrician confronts that is irrelevant to the individual's a wuewelfare.
Regardless of the interpretation of 6 (measurement error, unobserved covariates, etc.), it
should be stressed that the assumption that the observed covariates Z are exogenous -i.e.Z
serves as its own instruments —amountsto a best-case scenario for identifying the parameters
of interest. Yet, even instrumenting strategies that are suitable for estimating linear conditional
mean functions in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, errors-in-variables, etc., will not
in general suffice to identify all parameters of interest in a conditional variance function, as will
be seen below.
Finally, while the exogeneity of some elements of the Zvectorused here might be
questioned, there are no obvious instrumental variables that would be manifestly preferred to
using the elements of Z as their own instruments; this issue is taken upagainin section flLb.
8form of cc) will determinewhichparameters ofthe variancefunctionareestimable.The
simplest case is where re=0and where the econometrician assumes the correct form foro(.),
inwhich case all elements of$ can in principle be estimated.more relevant case to consider
is where (3b)isthe true variance function and the econometrician assumesa linear variance
function or(Z;$)=Z$=fl0+Z1$1.In this instance, the constant term parameter, o' willcapture
the effects of unobserved heterogeneity, absorbingre as well as r8. As such, $o re, and
are not separately identified but the slope parameters fi1are,at least in principle, estimable.
If instead the true variance function waso(Z;$)r8r0 and if a(Z;a) was assumed to be
exponential (c(Z;$)=exp(Zfl)), the constant term parameter $wouldagain absorb re and r.
For other specifications nonzeror may have less straightforward implications for estimating
the variance function parameters.
The econometric analysis conducted below estimates linear and exponential variance function
models. We stress, however, that so long asre is nonzero, the econometrician's estimates of
the variance function will be biased; the bias may ormay not be confined to the intercept
paRameter. For the welfare evaluations undertaken in section V. a key implication of such bias
is that it will tend to result in overestimates of the a antevarianceconfronted by the individual.
That analysis proceeds as if re=G, but in actuality the magnitudes presented in that section
should be viewed as upper bounds on the true magnitudes.
m. Econometric Methodology and Sample Construction
liLa.&onometdcStrategy
Aneconometric model is suggested by (.)and(.).Assumethe data are T independent






whereZ,a', and fi'are1 xk vectors and where c(Z;ft)=Z# or 7(Z$)=exp(Zfl).
Estimation of and inference concerning X=(a',fi']' is carried out via a generalized method
of moments (GMM) approach (Hansen (1982); Newey (1985); Crowder (1987); Davidson and
MacKinnon (1993), chapter 17). Consider the following cross-products of instrwnentsand






E[m(X)] =0 follows as a consequence of (4)-(5a,b), and it is this vector of moment restrictions
that provides the basis for the GMM estimator, which is given by the minimizer of a quadratic
form in the moment functions or estimating equations m(X),"
nm F(X)m(X)'tF1m(X),
18. In this formulation, if is a consistent estimator of var(V'Tm(X)) obtained using firstsge
residuals from least uares estjmates r of X. Theasymptotic covariance matrix of Vflis






In this instance, the GMM estimate of a is seen to be identical to OLS and its asymptotic
covariance matrix identical to a White-type heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimator.
The GMM approach is taken so that inferences concerning ficanbe made in astraightforward
anddistribution-robust maimer and, as will be seen below, so that several useful tests of
misspecification can easily be conducted. Maximum likelihood under a normality assumption
(the Low and Ormiston (1991) approach) in conjunction with a family of score tests is an
alternative strategy that was considered. Although asymptotically less efficient than ML, the
GWvf approach is preferable for the purposes at hand since -unlikeML -itis robust against
a variety of departures from normality.'9
IJLb. Data and Swapling Cosisiderations
The empirical analysis utilizes data from Wave I of the New Haven; Connecticut site of the
Epidemiological Catchment Area (ECA) 1980 survey of non-institutionalized individuals
conducted under the auspices of the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). The
survey is designed primarily to assess the prevalence of mental disorders -includingalcoholism
-ina community setting. The ECA data set is quite well-suited for study of the labor market
consequences of alcoholism as it combines medically sophisticated diagnoses of alcoholism with
information on income and labor force participation and demographic chaiacteristics.
19. Indeed, on the basis of some normality tests that we conduct and report below, there is some
suggestion that a log-normality assumption may be tenuous for our data.
11The ECA surveys were conducted by five major university teams in five areas of the
countiy: New Haven, cr(YaleUniversity); Baltimore, MD (Johns Hopkins University);
Durham, NC (Duke University); SL Louis, MO (Washington University); and Los Angeles, CA
(UCLA). Individuals aged 18 years old and older were surveyed the New Haven SMSA,
comprising 13 towns that at the time of the survey had an adult population of 420,000. Wave
I of the survey was completed between 1980 and 1981, ftlding 5,034 observations for the New
Haven site, a 78% completion rate. At the New Haven site, the elderly were substantially
oversainpled; thus explaining the relatively small sample size ultimately used, as described
below.20
From the 5,034 observations in Wave I of the survey, attention is restricted to ma1es aged
30 to 59, with this age truncation rationalized by results discussed in Mullahy and Sindelar
(19Th) where the importance of accounting for peculiarities in the relationships between
alcoholism and labor market success at both the beginning and end of the working lifecycle is
demonstrated. Given the substantial oversampling of the elderly at the New Haven site, thisage
restriction reduces the sample size to 555usableobservations. The extent to which our
results generalize is thus an important consideration.
Assessment of disorders in the ECA is via a professionally designedsurvey instrument, the
20. See Eaton and Kessler (1985) for details on the ECA Surveys.
21. We focus on males both because of their fargreater propensity to suffer from alcoholism
vis-a.vis females and because of the considerable body of accumulated researchregarding the
specification of earnings models for males; sac Willis (1986).
22. To be precise, the reduction from the original 5,034 observationsto the sample of 555used
in this analysis is due to the following restrictions:
1. Restriction to age 3O59: 1,420 observations remain;
2. Restriction to males: 604 observations remain;
3. Miscellaneous missing data: 555observationsremain.
12Diagnostic Interview Schedule (1)15), which corresponds to the American Psychiatric
Association's DSM-ffl disorder diagnoses. This avoids the self-selection problem in which only
individuals who seek treatment can be determined to be alcoholics, and avoids to a large degree
the potential for self-reporting biases with regard to alcoholism. Although the issue of the
accbncyandquaiityofthediagnosesbasdontheDIsisofcourse,anopeno,EcA'5
DIS-based diagnosis of alcoholism has been found to have reasonably good correspondence with
alternative diagnostic approaches (see Anthony et al. (l985))B
For this analysis we consider two alternative charactàrizations of alcoholism. In the first,
we define the variable ALCOHOLISM as a binary indicator of whether or not the individual
ever satisfied DSM criteria for alcoholism. In the second, which we implement to determine
whetherthetiming of the onset of alcoholism symptoms may be important, we define two
variables, EARLY ONSET and LATE ONSET ALCOHOLISM, which subclassify
ALCOHOLISM by whether the initial onset of an individual's alcoholism symptoms were up to
age 18 years or after age 18, respectively.
If one wished to treat alcoholism as an endogenous consumption behavior, it is not at all
apparent what identifying instruments would (a) be conceptually appropriate and (b) be
practically available? Even if some conceptually appropriate instruments could be identified
(e.g. in general, one might consider using lagged alcoholic beverage prices, although such a
strategy is not available to us since there is no geographic variation in our data), the recent
econometric literature has stressed the dangers associated with using instruments that are weakly
correlated with included endogenous variablesY Measures like ftmily background variables
23. See Mullahy and Sindelar (1993a) for discussion.
24. See Strauss (1986) for a general discussion of such issues.
25. See Staiger and Stock (1993) for a very interesting discussion.
13are anotherpossibility,but the circumstances under which their use would be appropriate are
also liinited3' The empirical analysis, therefore, follows the mainstream tradition in the health
capitalliterature (e.g. Bartel and Taubman (1979, 1986)) and maintains that the health capital
measures (here, those pertaining to alcoholism and physical health status) are econometrically
exogenous?
Table 1 defines the variables used in this analysis while the sample descriptive statistics are
displayed in table 2. IL should be noted that INCOME and SCHOOLING are created as
pseudo-continuous variables using interval midpoints. For SCHOOLiNG, "17" was used to fill
in the open-ended upper interval "grad school," while for INCOME '120" was used to fill in
the open-ended upper interval "greater than $l0O,0O0." Income is income from allsources;
more precisely, it is how much income the individual "brought into" the household in the
26. See Kenkel and Ribar (1993) and Mullahy and Sindelar (1994) for discussion.
27. The American Psychiatric Association as well as the World HealthOrganization provide
some quasi-official standing for the disorder view of alcoholism in defining alcohol dependence
and abuse as psychological disorders (see NIAAA (1990), Chapter VIII). However, it should
be noted that there are many alternative views on the issue of whethei alcoholism issimply a
health problem or instead is a complex, heterogeneous phenomenoninvolving individual choice,
genetic and metabolic heterogeneity, etc. (see Vaillant (1983), Sournia (1990), Pingarette (19?8),
NIAAA (1990), and, in a more general context, Becker and Murphy (1988)),so that the issue
of the econometric exogeneity of ALCOHOLISM is admittedly unsettled. Ifexogeneity fails,
then the estimates of the ALCOHOLISM coefficients will be inconsistent, with the biasnot
signablea priori.
28. While the upper censoring of the INCOME variable mightappear problematic, only 9 of the
555observationsin the sample report personal income in the $100,000+category. Moreover,
Mullahy and Sindelar (1993a) show that estimates of the conditional mean of LOG-INCOME
are not sensitive to how the upper interval is treated, both by using alternative 'fill in" values
than the one used here and, more explicitly, by accounting for thecensoring via an
upper-censored semipaiametric Tobit model due to Powell (1986). In light of these results, and
since the pseudo-continuous approach greatly simplifies theeconometrics, the strategy pursued
here would seem a reasonable one.
14previous year, whichpresumablyincludes transfer payments.V JENCE is generated
in the standard manner as age minus education minus 6. The two health status variablesare
measures of overall physical health and a diagnosis of lifetime alcoholism problems.
IV. Estimation Results
The estimates are presented in table 3)° Columns 1-3 report the results when the lifetime
alcoholism variable (ALCOHOLISM) is used; columns 4-6 report the results when alcoholism
is subcategorizedby the timingof its onset (EARLY and LATE ONSET ALCOHOLISM). The
results in column 1 suggest thatbothhealth outcomes of interest have statistically and
quantitatively important effects on mean log-income, with the point estimate associated with
ALCOHOLISM approximately one-half that associated with not being PHYSICALLY
HEALTHY. Using exp(a9-l to estimate the percentage change in E(ytlZt) due to turning on
the j-th dummy variable, the results in column 1 translate into a cererisparibul' 22% increase
in income for individuals not having ALCOHOLISM and a 48% increase in income for
individuals who are PHYSICALLY HEALTHY.
The results for the X variables are seen to be consistent with the standard results found in
the human capital and earnings literature: a concave EXPERIENCE profile; strong
SCHOOLING effects; and statistically significant estimates for MARRIED and WHim. It
29. A reader has noted that one implication of the income measure including transfers is that the.
welftre losses from a wue income variance may be overstated.
30. Estimation is performed using GAUSS on a personal computer. The GAUSS estimation
code is available on request.
31. The ceterisparibta is an important consideration here since alcoholism may have important
indirect effects on other human capital components over the course of the life cycle, e.g.
presence of alcoholism symptoms may correspond to reduced educational attainment. See Cook
and Moore (1990) and Mullahy and Sindelar (1989, 1990, l993a,b) for further discussion.
15might benoted that the EXPERIENCE effects are smaller and statistically somewhat weaker than
might generally be anticipated.By and large, this appears to be attributable not so much to
samplingquirksordata problems, but rather to the fact that the ages of the individuals in the
sampleare restrictedto 30 to 59. By truncating off the lower end of the age distribution (i.e.
18 to 29), the portion of the profilethatis likely to be most steeply sloping in experience is not
observed in the estimation sample?
Columns 2 and 3 of table 3 display the estimates of the conditional variance functions under
the exponential and linear assumptions, respectively.The results are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar for both specifications of a(.), and support nicely the hypothesis that health
problems may have important implications for not simplythemean, but also for the variance,
ofLOG-INCOME. Having ALCOHOLISM and not being PHYSICALLY HEALTHY both
imply large ce:ertcparibus increasesin the conditionalvariance ofLOG-INCOME, withthe
magnitude of the ALCOHOLISM effectagainapproximately one-half thatofthe effect due to
not beingPHYSICALLYHEALTHY? Moreover, itisinterestingto see thatbeing
MARRIED is -likegoodhealth—afactorthat stabilizes incomeoutcomes inthesense of
reducingtheir conditional variance arounda givenconditional mean?
32. SeeMurphy and Welch(1990)for further discussion.
33. Wecomparedthedistributionsofthe OLSresiduals for separatesubsamplesof alcoholics
andnonalcoholics. The keydifference in thedistributions(afteradjustingformeandifferences)
appears as a greater sprea& in the low end ofthe distribution for alcoholics ascompared with
nonalcoholics.
34.The parameterestimates in table 3 suggest that the partial effects ofALCOHOLISM on the
conditional meanand theconditionalvariance ofLOG-INCOME are negative and positive,
respectively. Todetermine the partialeffects onthe conditionalmean and variance ofINCOME
itself,additional computations are required. Fromthe momentpropertiesof the lognormal
distnbution, and dropping observation subscripts to reduce clutter, then E(YZ)=exp(p+a/2)
and var(Y Z)=exp(2p+a)(exp(o)4) (recall, a denotes variance, notstandarddeviation). For
(continued...)
16Because estimation of$ is of primary focus here, tests for misspeciflcation of the conditional
variance functions are of seine interest. Since misspecificaxion of p(Zta) will in turncause
problems for consistent estimation of a(Ztfl), testing for misspecification of either is of concern.
Following the methodology developed by Tauchen (1985), Newey (1985), and Pagan and Vella
(1989), the tests involve examining cross-products of the estimated residualsand p.1with
a vector of functions of ;otherthan the vector used to form the moment functionsmjt(X) (i.e. ;itself).Under correct specification of the conditional mean or variance functions, such
cross-products should tend in the limit to a zero vector. For the null hypotheses that the linear
form of p(Zta) and the exponential and linear forms of o(Z1$) are correct, the test statistics
(each under the null) are 12.22 (p=.09),10.39(p=.17), and 11.10 (p=.13), respectively.
Accordingly, there is no significant indication of misspecification of the kind tested here?
34. (...continued)
a given X-vector of covariates, and using the linear specification of a(Ztfl) to simplify
computations, the signs of the partial effects of ALCOHOLISM are determined by whether the
following ratios are greater or less than one:
E(YIALCOHOLISM=l,X) IE(YALCOHOLISM=0,x)=exp(aA+ A12)(1
and
var(YIALCOHOUSM=1,X) / var(YIALCOHOLISM=O,X) =
exp(2aA+ X((exp($A+ -1)1(exp(X$x) -
wherea=(aA,ax')' and areconformed tocorrespond to
Z=(ALCOHOLISM,x')'. Using thepoint estimates from table 3, the ratio ()isseen to be less
than one, so ALCOHOLISM indeed is estimated to have a negative partial effect on E(Y I Z) for
any X. To determine the partial effect on var(Y I Z), particular values of X must be considered
since the first term on the its of (**) is less than one while the second (bracketed) term exceeds
one when evaluated at the estimates of table 3. It turns out, that (**) is substantially greater
than one at every Xvectorin the sample, with a range of 1.47 to 1.62. It thus seems fair to
conclude, as is the case for LOG-INCOME, that ALCOHOLISM reduces INCOME's mean but
increases its variance.
35. For conducting the tests, the functions of; are specified to be the 7x1 vectors containing
the cross-products: ALCOHOLISM*PHySICALLy HEALTHY;
(continued...)
17Columns 4-6 of table 3 report the results obtained when the EARLY and LATE ONSET
ALCOHOLISM variables are used in place of the single alcoholism indicator. In the conditional
mean function, it is seen that alcoholism's largest and most significant deleterious impacts are
when its initial onset occurs after age 18. Conversely, it is when alcoholism's initial onset is
at or before age 18 that the variance of income is most affected. Although both EARLYand
LATE ONSET ALCOHOLISM have positive associations with income variance, the effects of
EARLY ONSET are more than twice as large as those of lATE ONSET (with the estimated
effects somewhat stronger for the exponential variance function specification).
V. An Evaluation of Welfare Losses Due to Alcoholism and Poor Health
To assess the magnitudes of the welfare losses attributable to alcoholism and to poor health,
the expected utility framework sketched in Section II is adopted. That is, differences -
specifically,as shown below, reductions -inexpected utility owe to the shifts in the probability
distribution of INCOME associated with either ALCOHOLISM or not being PHYSICALLY
HEALTHY.
Such welfare measures can be rationalized in terms of the value individuals attach to




ALCOHOLISMMARBIED; and PHYSICALLY HEALTHYMARR[ED. It should be pointed
out that tests of this kind are renowned for having low power against a wide variety of
alternatives; see Bierens (1990).
36. The certainty equivalence of an income lottery is mean income minus the risk premium.
37. For expositional simplicity the following discussion is cast in terms of a scalar 'poor health"
measure although the analysis that follows will be conducted for both poor health measures,
ALCOHOLISM and not being PHYSICALLY HEALTHY.
18certain monetary valuescorrespondingto expected utility in the two states, i.e.
ce(EU(Hj,Xn'X)) —cc1,jE(G,P}
denotesthe certainty equivalence(indollars) ofthe expected utility receivedunder theincome
lotterythe individual confrontsif a anteinhealth status j.
For the reasons spelled out earlier, we feelthat our estimates of the
ce1should beviewed
asupper bounds on the true measures. Since our estimation procedureislikely to overstate the
aante variancefaced by individuals, and since risk-averse individuals will demand positive risk
premia to accept higher variances, then our estimated risk premia will tend to be too high.
Given this caveat, we nonetheless feel it is useful and interesting to obtain a sense of how such
risk premia affect computations of the costs of poor health.
For illustrative purposes and for ease of computation, V(Y;7) is specified to have a constant
relative risk version (CRBA) form that depends on the single parameter y, i.e.
V(Y;7)=(Y7-l)/.y, which has as a limiting case V(Y;y)=ln(Y) as r0. and has the property
that it characterizes risk-averse (-neutral; -loving) preferences for y< 1 (=1;> 1)." Focusing
here on non-risk-loving preferences, only values of ￿ 1 are considered. The work of Hansen
and Singleton (1983) and Constantithdes (1990), among others, suggests that values in the range
(-2,1) might be reasonable to consider. Accordingly, the sensitivity of the welfare cost estimates
to the assumed degree of risk aversion is assessed by considering values of yE {-2,-1,0,1}, with
7=0 understood to imply V(Y;7)=ln(Y).
The computations are greatly simplified by assuming that the probability distributions of
(INCOME) are lognormal. To gauge the reasonableness of such a lognormality
38. See Hey (1979) for a good general discussion.
19assumption, a testis undertaken todetermine whether conditional normality of LOG-INCOME




E( Yt -- 3n)2zt]0,
corresponding, respectively, to conditional symmetry and conditionalmesokurtosis. Using only
the lifetime alcoholism variable (ALCOHOLISM) for this exercise, we find that the X2) eP
statisticsfor the linear and exponential variance function specifications are 4.45 (p=.ll) and
7.42 (p= .02), respectively. Despite the mixed evidence on lognormality provided by these tests,
maintaining conditional lognormality does not seem terribly far-fetched for thesedala?
The probability distributions of YtIZt are thus assumed lognormal. Focus is primarily on
the outcomes for two distinct subpopulations (good health and poor health).4° Given the
assumptions on CRRA indirect utilit/' and conditionally lognormal income, it followsthat the
39. See Pagan and Vella (1989) for additional discussion of this genre of misspeci&ation test,
and Kopp and Mullahy (1990) for some recent applications.It should be noted that the
properties of standard normality tests based on third and fourth sample momentsof OLS
residuals (see, e.g., Greene (1990). p. 329) are uncertain in this application given the presence
of conditional heteroskedasticity established above. The test proposed here, conversely, should
have proper asymptotic size regardless of the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity.
However, since high order moments of the estimated residuals are used in computing the test
statistics, some caution should be exercised in interpreting them given our relatively small
sample size.
40. Henceforth, when examining effects due to ALCOHOLISM, PHYSICALLY HEALTHY will
beabsorbedaspartofX, andviceversa.
41. Representations of V(Y;y) less risk averse than ln(Y) (here 'yE(O,l)) actually suggest
positive willingness to pay for increased a (i.e. downward-sloping indifference curves in (p,)
(continued...)





recalling that c denotes variance, not standard deviation. Thecej are defined by placing unit
probability mass on some Y in the domain of V(Y;7) such that
71cej ='i'exP(it&j+
giving
ce1 =exp(pj÷ .57°j) jE{G,PJ.
The cej computed here can bethought of asceteiisparibusestimates:holdingother factors
constant only the health state variable changes, so this set of estimates conceptually addresses
the question of the worth of recovering from the poor health state while still othenvisebeing like
a typical person in the poor health state. For ALCOHOLISM, these estimates are computed in
two different ways: first, by turning on the ALCOHOLISM dummy for observations in the
non-ALCOHOLISM subsample ("the healthy become sick"); second, by turning off the
41. (...continued)
space) despite the fact that V(Y;7) is still concave in Y for y€(O,1).Apparently
counterintuitive results like this have been discussed extensively and resolved by Meyer (1987)
and owe basically to the iognormality assumption. Heuristically, while increases ina1
correspondto an increased risk premium in health state j,theyalso serve to increase meaá
income as a consequence of the panneterinflon of the lognormal's mean function.
42. Given, that is, up to an additive constant (.(1) that doesn't depend onj. See Aitchison and
Brown (1969) on the moment properties of powers of lognormal variates.
21ALCOHOLISM dummy for observations in the ALCOHOLISM subsample ('the sick become
healthy). Thus, using the 'healthy become sick' case to illustrate, forjE{G,P}
CCj=Etesexp(Xex + 6JP'A + .5txp(XtPx + JPA1 #SG,
whereis the Xronecker delta. Again, analogous computations are made to estimate the
PHYSICALLY HEALTHY equivalences.
The results are presented in table 4. In an important sense, the key comparisons are
between €{-2,-l,O}, the risk averse cases, and =1, the risk neutral case that might be
thoughtof as the standardapproaciL Panelslandfldisplay thecystimates based on the
ceterisparibus assumption.Focusing first on ALCOHOLISM, it is particularly strildng how
the cost' of becoming an alcoholic (panel I) or the 'valu& of recovering from alcoholism
(panel U) depends on the degree of risk aversion. The welfare differences are trivial if risk
neutrality (y=l) is assumed, whereasthedifferences in the monetary values of the good and
poor health states are considerable at higher degrees of risk aversion. This pattern is similar for
PHYSICALLY HEALTHY.
We conclude -admittedlyprovisionally -thatfailure to recognize the possibility of risk
averse preferences leads to a potentially serious underestimation of the magnitudes of the 'costs'
of alcoholism and poor health. Our conclusions axe provisional, as we have noted several dines
in the course of this discussion, because our estimates of conditional variances are necessarily
biased to the extent that unobserved heterogeneity e is an important determinant of the moment
43. The magnitudes are converted to 1991 dollars via the BLS all items consumer price index.
It should be stressed that all these figures are annual and as such do not represent the present
value of lifetime costs. Such computations, while possible, will depend among other things on
the age of the individual as weli as the rate of discount used.
22structure of income in our sample.
Vt Snmniry
This paper has expanded the standard approach to the welfare analysis of health-relaxed
economic costs by accounting for risk aversion and variance in income that depends on health
status. The results presented here suggest that such amendments may be both qualitatively and
—atleast in this application —quantitativelyimportant. Again we stress, however, that the
generalizability of the results beyond the population of "prime age" males must be approached
with caution.
The present study has provided some empirical insight into the role of alcoholism as a costly
health problem, suggesting that an evaluation of its welfare costs in terms of productivity
differentials alone may significantly understate such costs. In addition, the framework presented
here is a general one that might be applied to a variety of specific andJor general health
problems of concern. The obstacles posed by unobserved heterogeneity are unlikely to be
trivial, butby useof longitudinal data it may be possible to circumvent some of these obstacles
to assessing the cost of poor health. This is the next item on the research agenda.
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INCOME(1) Of households total incomebeforetaxesforpast
year, includingsalaries,wages, social security,
welfare,and any other income, how much wasearned or
broughtinbyindividual(+1000)
LOG—INCOME (y) Natural log ofINCOME
IndependentVariables
ALCOHOLISM —1if symptoms ofalcoholism ever present, —0else
EARLY ONSET —1if first alcoholism symptoms were preeent at or before
ALCOHOLISM age18, —0else
LATE ONSET —1iffirst alcoholism symptoms were present alter age 18,
ALCOHOLISM a0else
PUYSICIIflYHEALTHY —1it individual reportsphysical health is excellent or
good, —0if reportsfair orpoor
SCHOOLING Years ofcompletedschooling
EXPERIENCE Age in years minus SCHOOLING minus 6
EXPERIENCE SQUARED EXPERIENCE squared
WHITE —1if race is white, •0if race ii nonwhite




Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimua Maximum
INCOME 23.42 17.68 0.500 120.0
LOG—INCOME 2.91 0.785 —0.693 4.79
ALCOUOLISM0.204 0.403 0 1
EARLY ONSET 0.059 0.237 0 1
ALCOHOLISM
LATE ONSET0.144 0.352 0 1
ALCOHOLISM
PHYSICALLY0.899 0.301 0 1
HEALTHY
EXPERIENCE22.4 10.15 7.0 49.0
EXPERIENCE605.2 506.0 49.0 2401
SQUARED
SCHOOLING 13.44 3.04 2.0 17.0
MARRIED 0.723 0.448 0 1



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































certainty Equivalence Estimates foracosoLIsM and pHYSICALLY HEALTHY
(Figures are 1991 dollar.. in thousands)
ALCOHOLISM pHySIcALLY HEALTHY
computation ce ce, cc0
I. Well Become
sick"
y ——2 27.6 17.7 26.7 10.8
—1 31.5 22.6 30.7 15.7
o 36.1 29.5 35.7 24.2
1 41.8 40.1 41.7 40.2
II. "Sick Become
We11
y— —2 22.5 14.1 19.6 8.0
—1 26.2 18.6 22.8 11.6
0 30.9 25.1 26.7 16.1
1 36.7 36.5 31.7 32.3
32